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Deficits versus Differences: African American Children's
Linguistic Paths towards a Theory of Mind
Brenda A. Allen, Jill de Villiers & Samantha Fran1;ois0
Smith College, Tulane University0

1. Introduction

Historically, African American children's development has been
characterized mostly in terms of deficits. Language acquisition is no exception
(Bereiter and Engelman, 1966; Deutsch, 1967; Hall and Nagy, 1987a; Hall and
Nagy, 1987b; Hall, Scholnick and Hughes, 1987; Hart and Risley, 1995). In
general, these researchers argue that there are basic deficits in the amount and
complexity of the language used especially in low-income African American
homes. It is thus argued that low-income African American children's language
development suffers from insufficient input and that such inadequacies result in
other cognitive delays (Bereiter and Engleman, 1966; Deutsch, 1967; Hall and
Risley, 1995).
The development of a theory of mind is one such cognitive skill that has
been purported to show developmental delays in low-income African American
populations because of the presumed deficiencies in language. It is argued that
the development of a mature theory of mind depends upon socialization
experiences conveyed in large part by language about the mind and more
specifically talk about others' mental states (Astington, 1992; Astington and
Jenkins, 1995; Brown and Dunn, 1991; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000; de
Villiers and Pyers, 1997; Gopnik and Slaughter, 1991). Many of the studies on
the differential amount of talk about mental states in African American homes
relative to the amount of talk about mental states in the homes of their white
middle-class counterparts bore out earlier claims of deficiencies. For example, a
current analysis of the use of mental verbs in the Hall (CHILDES, 1984)
samples of B lack and White middle-class and working-class families produced
the graph shown in Figure 1. Thus, it is not surprising that when theory of mind
studies such as that conducted by Holmes, Black and Mille r (1996) show
African American children's performance to be delayed relative to their White
middle-class counterparts, the presumption of language deprivation in the home
becomes the ready explanation.
The present paper raises one of many major problems with the past research.
More specifically, the question is raised with regard to how the presumption of
language deficits has been studied, especially the use of language deemed
necessary for the development of a theory of mind. The data used to argue that
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there �re deficits in the quality of language encountered in working-class African
Amencan households, namely the reduced frequency of references to the mind
and mental states, results from language transcripts where simple counts of
me�tal verb usage are record ed for different race/class groups. While such a
codmg scheme l�nds a gross measure of mental verb usage, it tells us nothing
about the s�n�actlc s!ructures in which such verbs were used. Yet recent theories
argue that 1t 1s not Just the amount of mental verb usage that is the necessary
�recursor to the development of a theory of mind. Rather, it is maintained that it
mastery of complement sentences with mental verbs that enable the
1s the
_
ul!1�ate development of a theo�y. of mind (Astington and Jenkins, 1995; de
Villiers and Pyers, 1997; de y1lhers and de Villiers, 2000). The theory of
c_om�le?1ent sentences also mcludes communication verbs as a possible
hngms�1c route to a theory of mind because such verbs allow for the same
syntactic structures as mental verbs (Astington and Jenkins 1997·' de Villiers
'
and Pyers, 1997; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000).
Figure 1. Frequency ofParent's Use of"Mental Verbs" by Race/Class
Groups
0,06
0,05
0,04

0,02
0,01
0+--- 
Groups

I■ Black Working Class □Black Middle Class ■ White Working Class □ White Middle Class I
�h�s, the present investigation challenged the traditional analyses by
exammmg the _use of both mental and communication verbs within complement
sentenc�s by different race/class groups. Moreover, such usage was recorded for
both children a�d parents: It was hypothesized that the differences in gross
usage observed m the earlier studies may have been artifactual in that much of
th� �oded us�ge of �ental verbs may have resulted from more routinized or
op1mon �arkmg use m some groups (i.e.,"I don't know" or "I think I will have
an apple ). Such usage would not be p ertinent to the socialization around
mental states.

